Beyond 'Off the Derech' -- Why is Someone Committed?

            There is a growing concern, within the Orthodox world, about the increasing number of young individuals choosing to leave Orthodoxy. This phenomenon, often referred to as going 'Off the Derech', is indeed something that should foster concern and generate an on-going discussion such as the one that has resulted. What I find somewhat disconcerting with the present inquiry, though, is how the subject is generally being approached. There seems to be an underlying, powerful assumption that staying ‘on the Derech’, maintaining an Orthodox lifestyle, is simply normative. The issue is thus framed in terms of reasons for these divergences from what should generally be expected. The explanations, thus, often reflect an attitude of deviation, some problematic abnormality that led to an aberrant result. Are these, however, the correct assumptions by which to frame the issue?

            Thinking that individuals brought up Orthodox will generally continue to remain Orthodox throughout their lives is somewhat understandable. Metaphorically applying a principle of physics -- items stay as they are unless there is something that causes them to change – it could seem expected that someone with an Orthodox life-style would maintain it unless there is something that causes a change. Yet, I could also see limitations in such a theory. Early in my reading of Faranak Margolese’s book Off the Derech a question began to bother me. What if the issue being discussed was a familial love of camping and what to do if one of the kids started to not want to go camping? On the surface, this question would seem almost trivial in the context of the seriousness and fullness of the 'Off the Derech' issue. Obviously, commitment to Torah involves a multitude of considerations and touches upon the most significant of metaphysical issues. Yet -- and, in a certain way, this is somewhat noted in the book -- it also extensively involves the psychology of the human being and specifically the nature of the individual. As such, should we not actually start any investigation with the interests of a person just as we would ask, in a situation where one no longer wished to be involved in a traditional family activity, whether this individual simply did not really like this activity? The metaphorical comparison to the principal from physics actually breaks down because human beings are not just passive objects who are acted upon but they all have distinct, internally dynamic natures. Human beings have variant motivations and responses to life just as different people like or dislike camping.

            Phrased somewhat differently, the contention may be that individuals raised Orthodox will want to remain Orthodox unless something happens to affect this desire. The assumption would be that Orthodox nurturing is generally successful unless there is an external conflict or resistance that disrupts this nurturing. That, however, is still a most powerful assumption, for the Orthodox life-style is not a simple one and there is great divergence in humanity. Given the multi-dimensional and challenging nature of the Orthodox life-style, would it not be correct to assume that conflict between the strictures of Orthodoxy and the dynamic nature of humanity is a strong possibility? The fact is that Off the Derech somewhat deals with this concern in maintaining that parents, for example, should attempt to make their children’s observance of Torah, somewhat tailored to them, positive and enjoyable. It also does speak to some extent on different forms of Orthodoxy. The inherent parameters of Torah observance, though, are also still a given and the true nature and full extent of this issue is not really addressed. A concept similar to the idea that a person may simply not like camping is also not considered. There is a strong assumption that every individual – all things being equal -- really would want to follow Orthodoxy.

            To fully and honestly investigate why people are leaving Orthodoxy, I would thus contend that our first undertaking should really be to consider why people are Orthodox. To postulate a generic desire in any individual to observe an Orthodox life-style is too simplistic. There actually may be many factors involved in such a decision yielding a more complex model that one might first consider. We clearly have to look at the direct drives and motivations, on the behavioural and personal level, to remain Orthodox – and consider, in this regard, the place of the varying forms of Orthodoxy in such consideration. The issue, however, also goes beyond one’s personal response to life-style behavior. A further factor, for example, may be familial connection. Again applying the camping model, if this behavior is an integral part of the family experience, it may be that a person could be interested in going camping because of a desire for family connection even if the camping experience itself is viewed negatively. As the Orthodox life-style is even more all-inclusive in terms of family relationships, it could be even a greater possibility that the desire for family connection would also be a significant factor in why a person remains Orthodox. There actually may be numerous factors -- reasons, desires, motivations – in conflict and in support – in the decision to maintain or adopt an Orthodox life-style. It is then only with an understanding of the possible complexity of the decision to be Orthodox – whether conscious or not -- that one could truly investigate the decision not to be.

We may also wonder: if the motivation of family connection, for example, plays a significant role in the reason a person remains Orthodox, what could be its effect on the manner of the Orthodox life-style that then emerges? This question actually exists, in some manner, throughout the discussion concerning ‘off the derech’, specifically in regard to what exactly the term refers. What is the minimum behavioural requirement that defines someone as a member of the ‘Orthodox group’, in general and in this context? What then defines one as off the derech? What then may be lost in such a discussion of the border of Orthodoxy is that we may also inherently thereby be addressing variant motivational factors in observing Orthodoxy. There is an inherent connection between this discussion and the investigation of Orthodoxy itself. How one defines ‘off the derech’ and the nature of Orthodoxy may indicate what that individual’s perspective would be on variant reasons for observance. Similarly, one’s perspective on the variant reasons for observance could have a great effect on how one defines ‘off the derech’ and the nature of Orthodoxy.

Then there is the theological/philosophical dimension of the issue which clearly is of extreme importance in such an investigation. It would seem limiting and unrealistic to only consider observance or non-observance in regard to psychological factors. In regard to non-observance, it would seem almost bewildering to find someone who fully accepts Rambam’s Thirteen Principles of Faith who also does not integrate at least some aspects of an Orthodox life-style into his/her life. At the very least, there would seem likely to have been some type of inner contemplation to explain and justify the inner dissonance.  Similarly, even in one whose main motivation for observing Shabbat, for example, may be family commitment, as this commitment to observance touches the private space of the individual, the behavior has to be seen as more than just behavior. Such behavior is more than just the inherent action but would seem to touch upon a greater meaning in the action. There is more in what is happening than a person may even be aware.

 This then opens the further question of the nature of such a decision to be Orthodox and the interplay between the psychological, behavioural and theological motivations – separately and in their interwoven nature. As an example of this interwoven nature, we would have to recognize that one who likes the Orthodox life-style would be motivated to find theological reasons to support it while one who dislikes it would necessarily find reasons for the opposite. Similarly, we may find one with theological/philosophical issues in regard to the basic tenets of Orthodoxy also beginning to question behavioural decisions, not because the person is inherently bothered by this behavior but because of a desire not to be hypocritical. Interestingly, in a similar vein, we may also find one desiring commitment, comfortable in the theological confines of Orthodoxy, attempting to find halachic justification for certain behavior that is generally eschewed within Orthodoxy in order to avoid a contention of dissonance between the behavior and belief. One who wishes to identify as Orthodox will go to great measures to try and ensure that a certain behavior to which this person is committed is defined as permitted. Such an attempt is also not necessarily improper or wrong. What we can begin to see is that the ‘off the Derech’ question actually touches upon much more than this one issue narrowly defined. For many reasons, it demands investigation within broader parameters.  

Included in this investigation, as another example, would have to be the question: Do people generally see orthopraxis individuals, who do not believe in the general fundamentals of faith of Orthodoxy but may be fully observant, as ‘off the derech’ (in colloquial terms)? Should they? Inherent in that question is the very issue of how we define Orthodoxy and Orthodox – is it primarily by action or theology? What is our goal as we attempt to build the Orthodox group – incorporation of individuals who will adopt similar behavior or incorporation of individuals with shared theological principles? This has further implications in regard to the various sub-divisions within Orthodoxy. The observation has been made by some that individuals who leave more extreme right-wing forms of Orthodoxy, generally do not even consider modern Orthodoxy as an option. In their minds, it would seem, there is little difference between non-observance and modern Orthodox observance – after all they are both so vastly different from the behavior they were observing. What does this, though, say about Orthodox pedagogy and Orthodox identity?

The Off the Derech topic is thus actually one that is multi-faceted and opens many further areas in need of investigation. The real question is not only why people leave Orthodoxy but also why people are Orthodox. It is from that question that we may find out not only more about ourselves but clearer understandings of why people leave. With this article as a start, it is Nishma’s objective to further investigate this issue.

Jewish Nationalism and the Challenge of Its Uniqueness: Yeshiva Students and the Draft

With the development of what we may term modern Zionism, an issue arose as to the nature of the nationalism that was being asserted through this movement. Traditionally, the desire to return to Israel had religious roots and reflected an understanding of the unique nationality of the Jewish People. The goal through the ages was to return to the land but as a distinct Torah nation that would then meet these religious goals in the land given to the nation by God. This objective still found reflection in religious modern Zionism through the Mizrachi movement. Am Yisrael im Torat Yisrael b'Eretz Yisrael. To Mizrachi, the Jewish nation was not simply just another nation. The predominant secular elements of modern Zionism, however, did not see the desire for return in this manner. 
 
To Secular Zionists, the Jewish nation was a nation like any other -- and, to them, this is just what it should be. It was in this spirit that they demanded that the Jewish People itself should take action to re-gain the land of Israel and not just wait for Divine redemption. As a nation like any other nation, they declared that Jews should stop simply waiting for God to act on behalf of His Chosen People but rather should themselves do whatever is necessary to establish a state, just like any other nation would do whatever it deemed necessary. This comparison to all other nations was, though, not just a call to action, to act in the service of the nation as other nations would act in their own service. It was a further vision of nationhood. "David Ben-Gurion, the first prime minister of Israel once quipped: 'We will know we have become a normal country when Jewish thieves and Jewish prostitutes conduct their business in Hebrew.'" The goal was a normal country like any other country and not a unique country in any way, let alone a unique Torah country. It removed God from the equation of Jewishness -- emphatically declaring that Jewish nationalism was like any other nationalism. A Jewish state should be like any other state.

We thus had was two visions of what Israel should be – and, on the surface, it would seem, these two visions of Jewish nationalism co-existed with each other, over the years, in the furtherance of a joint goal to create and preserve the State. The result was not a harmonious blending of values but rather an acceptance of a dichotomy of results as certain secular conclusions were reached in some areas of the State’s social being and other religious conclusions were reached in other areas. The result, however, did endure – and was able even to include the Charedi population as well. There was tension but there was also co-existence. What, however, was really the basis of this co-existence?

To answer that question, we have to further ask, what, in the mind of the secularists, was their vision of a Jewish state which was also like any other state? In defining the country as Jewish, and not just generic, there must be something unique about it, in any event, which inherently would distinguish it as Jewish. By definition, a Jewish State could not be a state like any other for it would be Jewish. The secular Zionist ideal, in fact, did include a powerful infusion of what it believed to be the essence of this Jewishness, which it derived from, actually, the Tanach. It, in fact, called for a re-focusing on our ancient historical roots -- as presented in the Biblical literature with individuals such as Dovid HaMelech (specifically, as presented, solely within the actual books of Tanach) as our models -- and a distancing from the model of the Diaspora Jew who was associated with the influence of the Talmud. The most powerful philosophical voice within the movement was that of Ahad Ha’am, the accepted thinker of modern Zionism – who clearly defined a Jewish ethos for modern secular Zionism. So being a state like any other state did not mean, to the secular Zionist, to not be a Jewish state – so what did they mean by a Jewish state still like any other state?

The answer, of course, lies in culture. All countries have their own individual culture; being a state like any other state does not mean that all states share the exact same, generic culture. It is thus expected that a Jewish State would have a unique Jewish culture – and in this regard even secular Zionists wished Israel to reflect Jewish culture. Israel should be like any other state with its own unique culture just as all states have their own unique culture.

It is in this regard that religious Zionists and secular Zionists could find some point of agreement for, even within the secular vision of Jewishness, so much of Jewish culture flows from the religious roots of Jewishness. It was within this perspective that, perhaps, the secularists were able to make peace with themselves for adopting religious initiatives into the law of Israel – these demands of the religious were still a part of Jewishness. Shabbat, kosher, the kippa – these were all parts of Jewish identity in the eyes of the world – could one really imagine a State of Israel that did not include these images? There were grumblings over the impositions of Halacha upon Israeli life – but there was the begrudging acceptance that it still did reflect Jewish culture. In this regard, there was overlap between the religious and the secular. The religious and secular Zionist could co-exist in a disagreement over the implementation, within the State, of Jewish culture – but it would still be Jewish culture.

So what, then, did the secularists really mean to exclude through its cry for a State like any other? From some thoughts I heard in regard to Gush Katif, I began to understand what the secularists really meant.  Their focus really was the issue of God-consciousness, which they, sadly, wanted absent in their Israel. They wanted a country that acted practically like any other, where the processes of thought in the furtherance of the country were similar to those processes applied by other countries. This reflected the initial break the secularists had with the religious – that Jews should act on their own rather than wait for God. It’s nationhood first, with religious observance the culture of the nation; not God first with commitment to nationhood part of His directive. (Further on this distinction, albeit in somewhat of a different context, see my National Identity, Nishma Introspection 5767-1.) Religious behavior per se was not the real concern of the secularists. Of course, they would like less imposed restrictions from Halacha but, as an argument within the parameters of Jewish culture, you win some, you lose some. But theocracy, and a perception of God-consciousness actually being part of the State’s functioning, that they could not tolerate. In the religious Zionists, who also took action to create the State, they did not perceive a force that would promote this view of theocracy – and thus they could work with them. Their disagreement with them, they could define as cultural.

What about, though, the Charedim? They clearly saw such commitment to God-consciousness as the purview of the Charedim but that they could tolerate, and even consider in such legislation as the exemption from the draft for yeshiva students. This, most likely, had something to do with the small size of the Charedi population. The Charedim were on the fringe. The actual functioning of the State was within the realm of the secularists and the religious Zionists who co-existed, in the minds of the secularists, in a battle over culture.
The yeshiva draft exemption was thus safe in this world. The perception was that the two groupings in charge – the religious Zionists and the secularists -- both still shared a vision of a nation like any other directed by humans. These two groups would both serve in the army. The God-conscious Charedim could be tolerated on the fringe. They were not in the mainstream of what Israel was in any event – and so they could have their yeshiva exemption from the draft. As the Charedi numbers swelled, however, some concern did develop within the secularists. It would not be easy for them to co-exist with a stronger expression of God-consciousness. With the growth of the Charedi population and their further involvement in Israeli society, the old concern of the secularists in regard to the religious was beginning to re-surface. This was an element that put pressure on the Charedim and the draft exemption. 

This, however, was not the only issue of God-consciousness and Jewish nationalism that was now flowing to the surface. This speaker on Gush Katif that I mentioned above posed the following question: why did secular Israeli society come down so hard on these settlers from Gush Katif who, eventually, were forced to leave their homes? The answer presented was that it was their specific mentioning of reliance upon God that angered the secularists. A state like any other state makes decisions through political and strategic analysis – and this was what, it was argued, was done in regard to Gush Katif. If the settlers were in disagreement with the conclusion reached through that process of human deliberation that would be one thing. But, according to this speaker, when the settlers started to say that there was no need to pack up as God would never let anyone move them from their homes, the secularists became inflamed. This was doubly so because these settlers were religious Zionists. They sounded, in the minds of the secularists, like the religious of old who argued that Jews must wait for God to take them out of the Diaspora.  The secularists could accept such an argument from Charedim, who they tolerated as a small minority reflecting the quaint religion of old, but not from their partners in the actual building of the nation. They saw a powerful God-consciousness in the religious Zionists which they previously chose to ignore. This left the secularists wondering about their partners in running the State.

To review, in the mind of the secularists, the reason they were able to form a coalition, of some nature, with the Mizrachi was because they believed that these religious Zionists, albeit that they were still religious, accepted a similar model for Israel – that the nation must make decisions as any other nation would make decisions. The secularists knew that the Charedim did not accept this vision but, given the size and influence of the Charedim, they were not deemed to be a problem – and as a minority within the State, they provided some diversity within the culture. The issue was active God-consciousness. To the secularists, Israeli policy had to be absent this. In the religious Zionists, the secularists thought that they had religious elements of the people who shared this vision. With Gush Katif, the secularists began to recognize that this was not so. When the settlers first went to Gush Katif, while they invoked God’s vision of Israel, the secularists only saw this chant as existing once the pragmatic, political decision to settle this land was already reached. Those who settled Gush Katif -- in fact, all who settled Yehduda and Shomron -- were still seen as on-side politically and strategically. When elements of the inhabitants of Gush Katif refused to leave, the secularists saw that this was not true. These religious Zionists, even as they also declared that the Jewish People should take steps on their own to settle Israel, the secularists began to recognize, also had a God-consciousness even similar to that of the Charedim. They both shared the existence of a God-consciousness that Avinu She’b’shamayim, Our Father in Heaven, guides the Jewish People. The issue between the Charedim and the religious Zionists was in how God does so guide His nation, not that He does. The fact is that, over the years, the religious Zionists have become more vocal in proclaiming their unique God-consciousness. With Gush Katif, it was emphatic. This presented an issue for the secularists but the vocalization of this God-consciousness within the religious Zionist community had been strengthening for a while. In this regard, it was also presenting an issue in regard to the Charedim and the yeshiva draft exemption. There was a different God-consciousness developing that specifically did not exclude the draft.

Israel was perceived to exist of three groupings – the secularists, the religious Zionists and the Charedim with, seemingly, the two former entities forming some type of partnership in governing the nation that, to the secularists, was based upon a principle of, it would seem, human responsibility. As such, it was perceived that the religious Zionists would join the army just like the secularists – with the Charedim, given their God-consciousness, not doing so. This understanding, though, was a mistaken one. The involvement of the religious Zionists in the army was not without a God-consciousness – in fact, it totally reflected a God-consciousness albeit different than that believed by the Charedim. This became more and more evident with the growth of the Hesder movement – army service was more and more seen to be in fulfillment of God’s demands upon His people. Gush Katif was, in a certain way, a case of how secularists confronted this recognition of a devout God-consciousness, albeit it different from the Charedim, within the religious Zionist population. The fact is that this unique God-consciousness of the religious Zionists was already existent albeit that the secularists may have not perceived it or not wanted to perceive it. 

What is now occurring with the issue of the draft for yeshiva students may also be, in certain way, a further reflection of this difference in understanding of God-consciousness – which is now coming more and more into the forefront. In that there are religious Zionists amongst the proponents for change in the draft law, an issue may also be a further enunciation of their understanding of what God wants. The issue in this regard is not the absence or promotion of God-consciousness (the issue for secularists) but rather what this vision of God-consciousness should be. What is now also occurring, on one front, in this present battle over the draft, is a battle over God-consciousness. The religious Zionists are no longer willing to ignore their vision of God-consciousness or to see it as anything less than the Charedi vision. In fact, their belief is that theirs is the optimum manifestation of proper God-consciousness. Hesder is correct; total exemption from the draft is not what God wants. The world is changing. Previously, the secularists were willing to accommodate the Charedim, as a small population, with their God-consciousness. The religious Zionists were also willing to do so for they inherently respected the God-consciousness in the Charedim. Now the religious Zionists may, though, be placing a priority on their own value of God-consciousness.

So, one of the root issues in regard to the yeshiva draft exemption may be the role of God in Jewish nationalism. The secularists have a problem with that role and, while willing to tolerate a little voice of God-consciousness within Israel, are concerned about a more dominant voice. With the growth of the Charedi population, the yeshiva draft exemption can be an issue for them in this regard. There is also, however, another debate over God-consciousness aside from that initiated by the secularists – a question of defining God-consciousness. The yeshiva draft exemption could be an issue in this regard as well; the exemption clearly challenges the religious Zionist view of proper God-consciousness. This question of defining God-consciousness, though, may also not just be an issue within the context of the Charedim and the religious Zionists. What we may be defining as the secular population in Israel may also be dealing with their own issue of God-consciousness. 

While the early non-religious Zionists were secular and wanted no part of religious consciousness within its national vision of Israel, this is not the case anymore. Even amongst the non-religious – or, for a better term, the non-observant or non-Orthodox – there is also a present issue with God-consciousness. It permeates through Jewish identity more than was thought. Yair Lapid, in his address at Kiryat Ono College, basically admitted, in his opinion, that the secular vision of Jewish nationalism had ultimately failed. What secular Zionist leaders, such as his father, failed to understand was the unique God consciousness which permeated the beings of most Jews. In the minds of this majority of Jews, there was always Avinu She'b'shamayim, Our Father in Heaven, Who had a unique relationship with His People, Am Yisrael, the nation of Israel. Regardless of the observance level of any singular Jew, this was part of the general Jewish consciousness of the majority of the people. While it took on many different manifestations, in thought and action, this consciousness was inherent to Jewish identity -- and thus had to be inherent to a Jewish State. As much as the early leaders of secular Zionism may have wanted a country like any other, they could not -- for the people who were forming this country were unlike any other people. They had this unique God consciousness that permeated their very national identity, even in the absence of Orthodox observance. There is now a growing population in Israel, outside of the Charedim and religious Zionists, who are also clamoring for the incorporation of their view of God-consciousness. This may also be affecting the issue of the yeshiva draft exemption – but it is clearly being felt in many aspects of Israeli life beyond that. 

This religious consciousness, in the nation as a whole, is perhaps seen in regard to issues such as those presented by the Women at the Wall. It is also seen in the growth of the Reform and Conservative movements in Israel. The demarcations between religious (of this type) and secular are not so clear. This may be related to the fact that secular values and liberal religious values often overlap, Nevertheless, there are different formulations of what is termed religious being promoted throughout the country. The result is a lessening of a respect for the Charedi model especially as the only expression of religious consciousness, of God-consciousness. There may have been a time when secularists tolerated the quaint religion of the Charedim, allowing them, as a small group, in the observance of religion, to be exempted from the draft in the pursuit of their yeshiva studies. Nowadays, though, those being asked to accept the Charedi exemption are no longer just the secularists and these others may have an even stronger force of disagreement with this Charedi stance. Secularists, themselves, may also have problems today due to the Charedi numbers but the real issue in Israel today is this further recognition of God-consciousness in Israel and in Jewish identity in general. The challenge over the draft may be that many different elements in Israel are voicing different perceptions of Jewish God-consciousness, challenging the Charedi perception as the only one or the predominant one. This is extending beyond Orthodoxy.

The Secularists involved in the founding of Israel wanted a State like any other. What they did not recognize was that Jewish national identity was unlike any other national identity. There was inherent, for most Jews, a recognition of a special connection between the nation and Avinu She’b’shamayim. Recognition of this connection is growing in Israel but it is a connection that has many different shades of understanding – and, in our modern world, some not Orthodox. We, in many ways, are now experiencing in Israel, the first stages of how the country will respond to this shift. The further challenge to Orthodoxy will be that this new, open God-consciousness will not necessarily meet the parameters of Orthodoxy. It may also be less tolerant of Orthodox God-consciousness than the pure secularist. Looking on the positive side, one could say that the uniqueness of Jewish nationalism with an inherent God-consciousness is still being more and more enunciated. The reality, though, is that this also has its problems. The question is how to go ahead.

(Note: Within this issue of God-consciousness, I specifically did not deal with sincerity or propriety. What I am trying to identify is a matter of language, thought and/or form. A distinction between Halachic God-consciousness, within the parameters of eilu v’eilu must still be recognized – and my intent is not to place a non-Halachic God-consciousness in the same category as a Halachic one.

I also avoided dealing with the issue of whether some are invoking God to further their agenda or whether they really believe what they are saying. The very fact that these people are invoking a God-consciousness still must be noted.)

Agunot -- The Real Issue is Beit Din

The issue of agunot, again, sadly, has filled the Jewish and -- perhaps even more problematically - the non-Jewish media within the recent past. There is indeed a problem -- and it must be addressed. What I have noticed, though, is that the language that surrounds the discussion, rather that furthering a solution to the problem, actually, in many ways, only extends the problem. We talk about the agunah outside of its proper context and, to find any basis for a solution, we must, rather, define the issue within this proper context. The agunah problem must be placed within the general issue of Beit Din -- and to fully develop a proper and effective response to the matter, we must inherently deal with the modern issues in the place and structure of Beit Din in general. It is only then that we will be able to deal effectively with this specific issue. This, of course, is not to say that the patently criminal behaviour that is found linked to the agunah problem will be solved simply with this recognition but I do believe that by properly structuring the issue within its proper context, we would be able to better develop a method of responding to it. 

Right from the beginning, though, what one may find strange with my assertion is the implicit assumption therein contained that the challenge of Beit Din is not already being addressed. Beit Din would seem to be an essential part of the get process and thus, it would seem, any attempted solution to the agunah problem must already include the matter of beit din. The issue, however, is how we view get issues and, thus, the role of beit din within this process. What I am advocating for is the need to actually see beit din within its proper halachic parameters and this is not presently being done.

We should, perhaps, begin our investigation with how we presently look at the issue of the agunah and, more specifically, the connected perception most have of the giving of a get. In a general way, most people look at the giving of a get as simply a religious act -- an individualistic religious ritual done by a person, who wishes to do religion, in a totally personal context. Beit Din is then simply seen as part of this ritual. Defined as such, the giving of a get is, thus, simply seen to be a religious ritual that has no context outside of the person's religious desire to do the ritual -- albeit that there may be possible, powerful consequences for this individual who feels bound to this religious practice. The result of such a perception is that the one who is blocking the get procedure -- be it the man who does not wish to give it or, and there are cases of this, the woman who does not wish to receive it -- is solely seen as one who is blocking another from fulfilling this personal ritual, that is, meeting this religious obligation -- something deemed to be problematic because of the consequences to the one blocked who, within the context of his/her religious perceptions, cannot go on with their lives, specifically in terms of finding a new relationship. While this description may be applicable, on some level, in many cases, as a base for further movement on the issue, it must be recognized that, structurally, this is not really the way that Halacha actually sees the giving of a get in totality. Seeing the get process within this sole and narrow perspective may actually cause further havoc in the attempt to truly solve the overall agunah issue. We must see the issue within its actual halachic perspective.  

Within the context of Halacha, the get is part of the general divorce proceeding. It is not an isolated personal act but an action undertaken within the context of the court's, i.e. Beit Din's, overview of a divorce. This is not to say that a get necessarily needs a Beit Din, (on this issue, see Encyclopedia Talmudit 3:159) but the minhag [custom] is that it does. Beyond this, practically, the get is part of a process – i.e. the divorce litigation -- that often clearly must involve a court. This is so because of the outstanding issues which are necessarily included in a divorce break-up. Chinuch, Mitzvah 479, in defining this mitzvah of the get, enunciates this perception. The mitzvah is that when a man wishes to divorce his wife, he should do so through the halachic process of a get. The get, within the context of Halacha, is the concluding procedural element of a divorce process.

Let's expand this context. Indeed, originally, a get could be given unilaterally -- and even against the wife's will -- by a husband wishing to divorce his wife. This would, indeed, imply that the act was solely a personal one and not part of a court proceeding (except, perhaps, to ensure that the form of the get is executed correctly). Subsequent to Cherem Rabbeinu Gershon, however, which prohibited a get being given against a wife's will, this would seem to be clearly not the case anymore. The fact is, though, that it was also substantially not the case even prior to the establishment of this Cherem. T.B. Ketubot 39b informs us that the reason why the Rabbis instituted the concept of the ketubah was to limit unilateral action by a husband in this regard. If a husband would unilaterally give a get, he would be liable for the full payment of the ketubah, a substantial amount of money. A husband would thus either re-consider his desire to divorce or wish to go to Beit Din to get permission to give a get without being responsible for the ketubah -- thus clearly bringing the get into the realm of Beit Din. In that T.B. Ketubot 10a presents divergent opinions as to whether the ketubah is of Rabbinic (d'rabbanan) or Biblical (d'oraita) origin, it may even be that this was always an inherent issue within the Torah divorce system. The get was part of the Torah divorce proceedings -- and especially in cases of contested divorces, this necessitated a Beit Din.

This role of Beit Din is reinforced through other aspects of the halachic divorce system. It may be true that Biblically a man could divorce his wife against her will but since Cherem Rabbeinu Gershon this is no longer an option. Unless a wife consents to receiving a get, i.e. consents to the divorce, there is nothing that can be done outside of the Beit Din -- for it is only a Beit Din who can take action if it determines that a get is appropriate and a wife refuses to take one. This is similar in the opposite case as well. While it is the husband who must initiate the get procedure, and this must be done of his own free will, a wife has the right to petition a court for a divorce -- that is to petition beit din to declare that the husband should give a get. See Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer c. 154. If the beit din does so order and the husband refuses, the beit din can then take any action to force the husband to do so -- and this is deemed to be a good get given by the husband pursuant to his free will. See Rambam, Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Gerushin 2:20.

Given all this, how can we now understand the get process? In the case where both parties wish the get, there would seem to be no issue -- it would seem similar to any other case, within any other legal system, where there is mutual consent to the divorce. You may even want to define it as a personal matter. The fact is, though, that even in cases where the parties have mutually consented to a get, there are batei dinim who would still be reluctant to proceed, believing that a get in such circumstances is inappropriate within the parameters of Torah thought. This would be similar, in certain ways, to other societal legal systems who would only allow a divorce with cause. Divorce is actually not inherently solely about personal consent. By extension, a get is not really, in any circumstance, simply a personal, religious issue but rather – as with divorce issues within, actually, any legal system – a matter that also inherently involves the society and, thus, societal institutions. A get is a divorce, with all the contextual meanings of this word – and a fundamental role of beit din in the process is as this legal representative of Torah society.

Let us continue with the case of mutual consent, when the parties have agreed to wishing a divorce. We can assume that, in such a case, if there is any other outstanding issues, the parties would have also agreed on how these issues will be reconciled or the parties would have accepted that they would be adjudicated pursuant to given methods of conflict resolution. Like any other litigation, there will be a resolution. By definition, in the interests of society, a divorce will not be granted until these other matters are worked out; the disagreement between the couple will naturally postpone the divorce, regardless of how much the parties may wish for one. Divorce in terms of separating the bond between the two members of the couple is part of a greater realm of divorce in which many additional matters -- custody, property -- must also be adjudicated. Sometimes the marital bond between the couple can be severed before this adjudication but the process for these further determinations must be in place or is inherently in place. If they are not, the severing of the marital bond will, simply, within any normative legal system not occur – not until the court has ruled on these matters. Within the Torah society, this falls also under the role of beit din.

Let us now apply this further to the get. The two parties, in desiring the get, may not be thinking of these additional issues but the fact is that they are there and they have to be addressed. This is part of the process of divorce. The fact is that when a couple, together, approach a beit din solely to arrange for a get, the couple have effectively agreed upon a method of dealing with all the other substantial issues -- thus the only matter before the beit din may be the get, seen in solely religious terms. Essentially, though, from the halachic-legal perspective, with the giving of the get, the beit din is inherently accepting the conclusions reached about the other divorce issues. 

When the two parties, however, do not, together, approach a beit din requesting a get, the full -- and true -- matter of divorce in all its complexity, it must be recognized, is really the issue, not just the get. From a halachic perspective, the issue is not simply that one wants a get and the other does not (or is trying to use the get as an unfair bargaining chip). The issue, from the perspective of Torah, is that one wants a divorce and the other does not. Or the issue concerns the corollary issues that accompany a divorce. The issue is thus really litigation before Beit Din. It is important to note that this litigation before beit din would also include whether the parties are bound to any previously determined decision concerning the divorce, even by a secular court. Once it comes to the get, it is beit din that is halachically the final court of record. By proceeding with the get, it is inherently accepting the other decisions as binding. It can, though, decide not to do so and thus demand a re-adjudication of these issues before overseeing the get.

No one, in our present halachic reality, has what you may term a right to a get. Inherently, a get is only good if the husband gives it of his own free will. The corollary of this is that a wife does not have a legal right to simply demand a get. Theoretically, a husband can refuse to give a get. Of course, it may be unethical for the husband to so refuse – and moral suasion can be brought upon the husband to give a get – but this does not mean that the husband does not have this right. He does. The only exception is when beit din declares that a husband should give a get -- and a wife can request such a ruling. In such a case when beit din, properly convened, gives such a ruling – that is a ruling through proper adjudication that a divorce is appropriate -- the husband should not refuse and can be forced to act upon the court’s direction. The truth is that even in cases where moral suasion is being used to cause a husband to give a get, this really still necessitates a ruling of beit din. It is only a properly done adjudication before beit din that can clearly declare the husband to be incorrect in withholding a get. Until that point, one really can’t declare the husband wrong in refusing to give a get. The fact is, also, if the moral suasion is done without the sanction of beit din there may be further problems in the get being defined as one given through coercion and thus invalid. The result of all this is that an agunah case that demands public reaction should be, generally, really only one that has been properly adjudicated in beit din with the husband still refusing to follow the direction of the beit din to give the get. This is why proper adjudication in beit din is often the real issue. In many cases, the problems of agunot begin in the lack of a proper beit din adjudication process – including the determination of the forum. (Post Cherem Rabbeinu Gershon, this same argument, with halachic emendations, applies in the opposite model of a wife refusing to receive a get.)

Two recent articles reflect the problem that I am trying to address. This is not to say that the articles do not have legitimate points but, I believe, they are lacking in that they do not include this perception of beit din in their approaches. One, at http://www.thejewishweek.com/editorial-opinion/opinion/withholding-get-between-leverage-and-extortion, does not reflect on the role of an active beit din at all. The beit din, as with any court, is theoretically an imposing voice of authority with the power of adjudication. A get is not solely a matter of negotiation; there can also be judicial determination. While, truthfully, there may still be a problem due to the limitations on the enforcement capabilities of beit din within our society, I would argue that it is still important to define the issue correctly. In terms of the article, a beit din’s decision would also play a significant role in the determination of whether the withholding of a get is leverage or extortion.

In the other article, at http://5tjt.com/false-accusations-and-the-withholding-of-a-get/, the question posed is whether there is ever a legitimate reason for a husband to withhold a get. The answer of the posek asked is yes, in very particular circumstances – but this demands a ruling by a posek as such. While the author does also refer to beit din in this context, the use of the term posek in this discussion only reflects the problem I am noting and adds to the confusion. A posek responds to an individual’s question; he responds to the person asking what he/she may do. This answer, however, does not extend to another who did not ask this posek, especially if the other person asks a different posek. In cases that involve conflict between individuals, the forum for such resolution is solely a beit din, albeit that if two people agree to a single dayan to resolve a conflict, that is also generally halachically acceptable.  The person being asked, though, should then be seen as an individual dayan and not as a posek. The author, to be honest, actually addresses the need to hear both sides by referring to the fact that the posek should only render a decision upon hearing from both husband and wife. There is still, though, the problem in this language for what is missed is the inherent litigious nature of the issue. This is a court procedure. This is not a time to send one party off to his or her posek. This is a time for both of them to go before beit din. 

The direction of an individual posek must be for the parties to go to beit din. What does it mean that the husband is withholding the get? It is only a case of such withholding if beit din has so ruled; the role of beit din does not begin just in the technical procedure of giving the get. A contentious divorce proceeding demands a court and that is what beit din is. If that article is discussing a case where there was a secular decision on custody which is being challenged and the posek believes that the challenge has a halachic basis, this only reinforces my point. Beit din is the halachic forum for adjudication and it is within this structure that a get is to occur. If a posek is being asked if there is any legitimate basis, within the case, for challenging a secular court decision on custody – that may be a proper question. But that question can only arise because of a perception that a get is solely a ritualistic undertaking. If the matter was before beit din within its proper definitions, the issue would already be before it. What is thus necessary is a clear structure for such adjudication. (The author actually does conclude with the need for a protocol for determining forum – which emerges from a recognition of the proper role of beit din.  While this is to be commended, I still believe that the language of the article would still promote the present incorrect understanding of the process and the subsequent difficulties.)

Of course, in some agunah cases, there is such a proceeding and a husband still refuses to give a get – and gets away with it because of the limited power of beit din to enforce its findings within the secular world and the husband often believing he can do better by ignoring beit din (not to ignore the cases of vice versa) – and we still have to consider how to better respond in such cases. I have mentioned this and do so again. Yet, in many cases, just like the one noted in this second article, the problem would seem to be really at the beit din level. Without a clearly defined beit din to which the husband and wife have to go (agree to go), the two parties – sometimes, sadly, just trying to forum shop and find the beit din that would be most approving of their side; other times, however, because of rifts in hashkafa reflecting the tensions in the Torah world -- remain in contention because there is a lack of a properly adjudicating beit din in the case. This role of beit din is actually an issue in regard to all litigious matters within the Torah society. It is unfortunately most pronounced in the case of agunah.
Within the general rules of our societies, if a couple – or individuals within a couple – wishes to divorce, they go to court. If they are able to work out the issues on their own, there is no need for an adjudication on the matter by the court; the court merely rubberstamps it. If they cannot, then the court must intervene to render decisions on the matter. There are no games -- for the court that has jurisdiction is a given. The parties are bound by it and know that they are bound by it. This is the first challenge in the case of the get and the agunah. Effectively, the Torah believes strongly in the role of beit din as the tribunal of adjudication within the Jewish People. From the Torah perspective, you do not go to beit din simply for a get. You go to beit din to adjudicate the matter of a divorce. When this procedure is not working effectively, problems are clearly going to ensue. This is an essential base issue in the case of agunah. 

Practically, even with this recognition, problems still will ensue. I don’t have all the solutions – or, practically, even some. My goal in this piece is simply to define the issue in a manner which will, hopefully, be more truthful to its essence and, as such, better serve it. I was involved in one agunah case where the problem was simply that the husband went to one beit din and the wife went to another. My solution, when I was asked to intervene, was simply to find a beit din to which they would both agree to go. I was actually able to do so quite quickly and within the week the matter was resolved. I know that this was a relatively simple case and what happened in that case will not be duplicated in every other agunah cases. What astonished me, though, was that no one involved in this case previously came up with such a solution. I believe it was because I saw the issue as a beit din issue and defined the problem jurisdictionally. This was the opening of the solution in that case.
Beit din is part of Torah life and structure. This permeates the whole Torah system but is perhaps most felt, presently, in the case of the agunah. To solve problems in that matter, the answer may be found in this recognition of the structure of beit din. That may be the place to start – at least in how we speak of the issues.

Rabbi Ben Hecht

Orthodoxy and Homosexuality

One of the great challenges of modernity for Jewish communities is navigating our relationship with the larger secular society in which we participate. The advancement of gay rights presents a particularly complex dilemma in this regard. While there have been numerous responses to variant specific issues within this topic, most responses have been of an ad hoc nature, focused on one particular aspect of the problem without consideration for its overall multi-dimensional nature. My goal in this paper is to examine this multi-dimensional character and identify the various battles that challenge us within this topic. It is not my intent to give solutions or even specific policy recommendations but rather to simply identify the issues in a more comprehensive manner. My ultimate hope is that this will help motivate our community to approach the matter in a holistic way confronting each sub-concern as part of an overall policy.

We can label the sub-topics as follows:

Individual

Orthodox Communal

Jewish Communal

General Society

Each of these sub-topics is not inherently independent and a concern found within one sub-topic may have applications to other sub-topics as well. In fact, individuals may feel that an issue which I have categorized within one sub-topic is actually better assigned to another one. I have no problem with this; I do not feel eternally bound by any of these definitions. The sole purpose of this presentation is to enable an orderly and encompassing discussion of the issue in its totality. If it allows for an initial discussion of this nature, it has served its purpose.

Individual

The first question that we must address is how we are to respond or relate to the gay individual. Before answering this question, though, we must first identify that there are two possible meanings to the word “gay” in this context:

A) a person who identifies himself/herself as having an attraction to the same-sex;

B) a person who is involved in same-sex sexual activities.

Each of these definitions demands a somewhat different response.

A) In regard to the individual who is simply using this term to identify that he/she is attracted to members of the same-sex, on the surface it would seem that our response should be no different than our response to any person with desires that could lead one to violate halacha – namely our response to everyone. All individuals possess drives that could lead them to transgress. These individuals who define themselves as gay, it would seem, should be seen no differently and thus should be related to in a manner that is similar to the way we treat all others. The fact is, though, that there are aspects of this drive which do distinguish it and, as such, some unique considerations may indeed.. As a base, though, it should be acknowledged that possession of same-sex attraction in itself should not be seen in the same light as transgression.

That said, let’s look at some of the special considerations that arise in this case. In the first place, there are individuals who have an adverse or uncomfortable response to individuals who simply identify themselves as having this drive. Many would contend that one of our goals should thus be to educate people to overcome this negative feeling – and I agree this should be a clear cut directive within our community. The fact is, though, that some of the reasons for this uncomfortableness emerge from value-determinants within the Torah community that cannot be ignored and which must be considered in this policy process. The Torah society, in many ways, is structured to limit or direct the role of sexuality in our personal and social relationships and connections. This structure is challenged by the reality of the person with same-sex attraction. The very identification of oneself in this manner presents therefore valid questions. These questions lead us into the more general issue of how we are to integrate such an individual into our community, which we will discuss more below. At this juncture, it is just important to recognize that, as much as we may wish to state that those who possess this drive should be seen as no different from others with alternate drives that can equally lead to transgression, this case does, in many ways, present unique challenges. For example, how is a person who identifies himself as having same-sex attractions going to be integrated into a yeshiva dorm? Within the Torah perspective, we can also ask if one’s sexual preferences should even be something that is openly communicated or should it be a private matter shared with others only on a need to know basis? While there are strong reasons to be welcoming to the gay individual, as defined in this context, the complexity of this issue cannot be ignored.

Another consideration that arises in our relationship to the individual who identifies as gay is our halachic obligation to assist others in avoiding aveirot. In this regard, the nature of this drive yields further complications in that the same-sex attraction drive, if defined as such, would seem to have no halachically permitted purpose. In that one of the most significant Torah methods for dealing with our drives is by directing them to find fulfillment in a halachically acceptable manner, the seeming incompatibility of this approach in regard to responding to this drive does present a difficulty. One approach is to assist the individual in attempting to transform the drive into a heterosexual one which would allow for the potential of a halachically acceptable, even commendable, manner of fulfillment. The aversion of many individuals towards this suggestion, though, must be noted. We can suggest or advise but imposition may yield further problems. In addition, attempting to modify and/or apply this commonly relied upon route should not bar us from finding other ways of responding to this issue. We must try and assist such individuals in their attempt to follow Torah and finding ways to help individuals sublimate their sexual drive must be on the agenda.

B) On the surface, how we respond to one who actually transgresses the laws against homosexual behaviour should be similar to how we respond to other transgressors. In our world where we are generally welcoming towards transgressors, even individuals who are mechaleleiShabbat, the one who transgresses these laws, prima facie, should be seen no differently. An issue, though, may be whether we define this law as a chok or mishpat sichliya. If the latter, we may not be so welcoming in the same way we would not be as welcoming to a thief or murderer, assuming, of course, that how we treat a transgressor may differ based upon this distinction. There are also other factors that have to be considered that may mitigate against a blanket statement of this nature.

The unique societal moral challenge that envelops this issue must be acknowledged. Not only do individuals define themselves through this transgression but there is also a general social milieu which considers those who challenge this lifestyle to be the ones who are morally weak. Given this, as much as we may wish to be welcoming to transgressors, our tolerance of the individual cannot be perceived as deviating from the Torah stand towards these activities. The one who drives to shul on Shabbat knows and accepts that Orthodoxy does not sanction this activity albeit that this individual is still treated warmly within the Orthodox synagogue. It may be more difficult to be welcoming when the individual who is being welcomed not only may think that the Orthodox position is quaint, no longer really applies or is archaic but further may believe that it is just plain wrong.

As an extension of this, it must be recognized that no demonstration of this transgression can be tolerated within the confines of the Orthodox communal structure. There would be a distinction made between the individual who eats non-kosher food and one who brings this non-kosher food into the synagogue. Similarly, the gay individual involved in a same-sex relationship may still be welcomed into a shul but it would be an entirely different matter if this person would wish his/her relationship to be publicly acknowledged in the shul environment or even for this person to openly demonstrate this relationship in this environment. That we cannot tolerate.

Overall we can contend that we must be welcoming, yet there are many issues involved in bringing this goal to fruition in this regard. We have to further contemplate these various issues to ensure that our welcoming does not give the impression that we are not loyal to Torah.

Orthodox Communal

As noted above, there are certain aspects of the Orthodox community -- some structural, some conceptual – that present certain problems in dealing with this issue. These items must be analyzed to see how they are to be applied within this context.

Torah responds to the reality of the sexual drive by attempting to limit its force through a societal structure that allows for intermingling between the sexes only under certain guidelines and parameters.

The Torah method of meeting the challenge of applying our sexual drive correctly would seem not to be to ignore it, nor to project the idea that a truly holy person would not have this drive, but rather by accepting the drive’s existence and force and undertaking methods by which to limit its force and the opportunity for transgression. The separation of the sexes is an important part of this program. This method of assisting us in controlling our sexual drive is obviously not available to individuals with same-sex attraction. In fact, the very separation of the sexes may further foster this drive. While obviously a most difficulty challenge, in responding to this issue we must consider how the Orthodox community can respond structurally to this problem.

The community’s conceptual focus on the importance of marriage may also present an issue that must be considered within this context. While there can be no doubt that the value of a marital relationship is most significant within Torah, an overriding presentation of this value presents a challenge within this context. There may be pressure on the gay individual to date when such dating is really inappropriate. Entering into a marital relationship lacking in sexual attraction has the potential to be very problematic and is not fair to the heterosexual mate. The simple solution is obviously to lessen the pressure on gay individuals to search for a spouse. To do so, though, demands of the community to define, for both men and women, a potential to live full lives even without marriage. This, though, must still be done without challenging the inherent value of marriage. We must be able to present to such an individual the potential to live a meaningful Torah life without marriage while, at the same time, not negating the value of marriage in general.

Another example of the problem that can emerge in this regard is the absurd use of the value which the Torah gives to relationships as an argument that, in some manner, the Torah must sanction same-sex relationships. The contention is very simple; in that the Torah states that it is not good for a person to be alone and that the only relationship that can remove this loneliness for a gay individual is a same-sex relationship, it must be that the Torah must sanction same-sex attraction is some manner. This has led to the assertion that the Torah only forbids one type of sexual activity between individuals of the same sex and actually allows others. While the absurdity of such an assumption is clear to anyone with even a rudimentary knowledge of Halacha, the sad reality is not only that such an argument exists but that many people in the world actually believe this to be the honest, Torah/Orthodox position. They consider any individuals who contend otherwise to be simply motivated by their own “homophobia” and not basing their position on a true analysis of Torah sources. As absurd as this may sound, this reality cannot be ignored. It is important to continuously challenge any assertions of this nature.

A further outgrowth of this problem that should also be recognized is how this entire issue is seen as encompassing the realm of love. The desires of an individual with same-sex attraction is perceived in our world to be about bonding and finding a “soul mate,” not simply the physical activity of sex. In a somewhat strange deviant manner, it is the very Torah value of finding an ezer kenegdo that is being used to substantiate same-sex relationships. After all, God does not want us to be alone for it is not good to be alone? The fact that the Torah clearly indicates that an ezer kenegdo must be of the opposite sex is simply dismissed. We must deal with this misapplication of Torah.

This in turn leads us to the development of groups for what are described as gay, Orthodox individuals. Such groupings reflect an inherent contradiction. It is one thing for individuals facing similar challenges to have the wish to share their fight but that is not what is occurring. These organizations actually seem to further foster the problems enunciated above. A same-sex Shabbaton specifically for individuals with same-sex attraction makes no halachic sense. Such events are social in nature and, given the nature of the challenge that these individuals are facing, a social event of this nature would seem to be inappropriate as it would actually highlight the sexual attraction. The challenges of integrating a gay individual into Torah society are manifold. Organizations or programs that attempt to do so by focusing on the “ritualistic” aspects of Torah while downplaying the severity of this transgression – even challenging this transgression by stressing the value of the relationship – must be addressed. The movie “Trembling Before G-d” is a perfect example of this manipulation. This movie has done a great disservice to Torah, even more so in that it portrays itself as an honest presentation of Torah. Responding to the development of such organizational structures and the furtherance of such programs within the Orthodox community must be one of the issues we deal with when confronting this topic.

Jewish Communal

There has always been an issue within Orthodoxy in regard to how we are to relate to non-Orthodox Jewish communal entities. This issue is exasperated by this topic. While in the past, there might have been a reluctance by the non-Orthodox to consider halachic parameters in their decisions, except in terms of convenience or practicality, there was not, in general, a vehement advocacy against the Halacha. It may be that they would not want to be bothered by having to be concerned about serving kosher food but they were not generally adamantly against the serving of kosher food. In regard to this issue, though, the overriding perspective that dominates the non-Orthodox world is that it would be morally correct to contest the Orthodox position. The result is that it is now much more difficult to relate to non-Orthodox entities and the question of how we can relate demands new attention.

This issue should not be defined solely in regard to how we relate to the other branches of Judaism. How we relate to them in general is a policy issue within Orthodoxy that demands its own investigation. There are obviously many different perspectives on this. In this regard, though, it should be recognized that this issue is one that these other branches perceive as giving them ammunition in attacking Orthodoxy. The simple Reform argument is no longer that the Orthodox do much more than is really necessary and it is possible for one to be a good person even without keeping kosher. Being Orthodox still did not necessarily mean that one was not moral even if he/she did all these “rituals”. This is not the case any more. The new Reform argument is that the Orthodox are not ethical as evidenced by their position on homosexuality and that being Reform is actually a higher moral viewpoint (and one can still do the “rituals” that one finds personally meaningful even as a Reform Jew). The result may be that we will have to distance ourselves further from the other branches than before. New battle lines are being drawn and we must be aware of them.

The greater issue in terms of the general Jewish community, though, is in regard to the general Jewish communal entities that oversee the community as a whole. They speak for the entire Jewish community or take positions that affect the entire Jewish community and may now represent or implement an anti-halachic perspective/policy if an issue touches upon the question of gays. How are we to respond to a Federation that advocates on behalf of an organization representing Jewish gays? Does Orthodox association with a Federation that adopts such positions imply that we agree with this position? In Toronto, an anti-Israel, gay organization was going to participate in the annual Gay Rights Parade, marching and denouncing Israel. The Jewish gay organization responded by marching and expressing support for Israel. The Federation supported this endeavour, calling upon Jews in general to join this protest for Israel. How are we to respond? Can we just be silent?

General Society

It is important for us to recognize that we are maintaining a position that runs counter to the general trend within our societies and, as such, promotes a moral position that is contrary to the “moral” position of a large segment of our society. Even more so, as this segment grows, the result is a value conflict for our host societies between the value of freedom of religion – that people should be allowed to follow their own religious consciousness – and the value of non-discrimination – that gays should be allowed the same rights as heterosexuals including that their relationships be seen as having equal value. We cannot be confident that freedom of religion will always trump over all conflicting positions. The result must be that we carefully choose the areas of greatest concern and focus on them. We must also be clear in how we articulate the conflict to describe it in such a manner that increases our chances of victory.

The actual potential harm to our way of life must be our first consideration. For example, in regard to the issue of same-sex marriage, while obviously contrary to our views, what actual effect is there upon us if such marriages are accepted? A greater concern should be any potential legislation that would demand that schools teach about “acceptable alternative lifestyles” which would force yeshivot to include, in their secular studies, lessons about same-sex relationships. Of course, the two issues are intertwined and the advancement of the former may add force to the imposition of the latter. This has to be a consideration in how we proceed but, on the surface, it may be better to concentrate on the latter where, since it imposes upon us, we may have a better chance of success.

A key point to remember is that, in a different yet similar way, we are potentially facing the same problems that our ancestors faced from host societies. In the Middle Age, the devout Catholic found the Jewish rejection of their faith to be an ethical, moral problem. It ran counter to their values and their issue was to what extent to allow this “improper” value in their society. The advance of secularism in Europe led to greater freedom of religion, but only because the values that were being challenged previously by these foreign religions, such as Judaism, were no longer important societal values. We now face a situation where our values may powerfully run contrary to the values promoted by secularism. In this situation, the secularist may not be as open to freedom of religion because it is not a case of one religious position being challenged by another religious position, both of irrelevance to the secularist anyway. How will the secularist apply freedom of religion when it is one of his secularist values that is being challenged? That is a question we cannot answer at this time but it is one of which we must be aware.

I hope this presentation is helpful in attempting to give an overall view of the many particulars included within this issue. It is important to recognize that, in addition to practical, policy analysis, these questions may raise, the entire issue may also demand of us further philosophical investigation of the entire topic of sexuality. It is my belief that at the core of secular society’s change in its attitude towards homosexuality is its formation of the issue as one of love and relationships rather than physical desire.

To assert our view of the subject, it will be necessary to respond to this issue which may demand from us a greater understanding of the Torah’s perspective on the connection between the emotions of a spousal relationship and the drives of sexuality.

I am, of course, open to any further suggestions of other issues that should be included in a holistic review of the entire topic as I have attempted here. I now leave it to you to further the analysis and investigation towards the goal of an overall policy in regard to how to deal with this issue. Please do communicate your thoughts.

Rabbi Ben Hecht